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Abstract:  Under English law, prior to 1970 young people up to the age of twenty-one lacked 
the capacity to make binding contracts, subject to certain exceptions.  The report of the Latey 
Committee on the Age of Majority, which had recommended a reduction to age eighteen, was 
one-sided and, so far as capacity to make contracts was concerned, offered scant evidence as 
to the motivations of the existing law. The Committee heard evidence from the Church 
asserting, with no evidence, that such rules were intended to control young people and were 
there to protect the interests of others.  This article argues, especially from analysis of the 
relevant case law during the 18th and 19th centuries – the principal period of development of 
English jurisprudence on minors’ contracts – that the law’s motivation had in reality been to 




With the coming into force on 1 January 1970 of section 1 Family Law Reform Act 1969, 
which lowered the age of majority from twenty-one years to eighteen years, the question of 
infants’ contracts effectively disappeared as one of interest to the courts of England and 
Wales. Since mediaeval times, as Simpson concisely puts it, ‘all contracts made by infants 
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were voidable at the option of the infant either at once or on attaining his majority’,1 though 
the common law developed considerably from the 17th century onwards and Parliament 
began to legislate with the Infants Relief Act 1874. 
It should also be noted that although the change in the contractual status of eighteen-
to-twenty-one year-olds coincided with the reduction in the voting age in the United 
Kingdom from twenty-one to eighteen years, under the Representation of the People Act 
1969, the two issues were separate and the one did not follow from the other. 
The Latey Committee on the Age of Majority, set up by the Wilson government under 
the chairmanship of Sir John Latey, which recommended the reduction in a report which can 
scarcely be regarded as even-handed and critical, referred to evidence received from the 
Church of England’s Board for Social Responsibility, which claimed that the restriction on 
infants’ capacity derived not from any desire to protect young people from possible malign 
effects of entering unwisely into contracts, but rather as a mechanism of control over them.  
However, the Board’s written evidence to the Committee, cites no evidence whatever for its 
assertions that ‘[h]istorically the concept [of an age of majority] is one of property rights in, 
and power over children, as much as of a duty to protect them’; or that there is a ‘legal age of 
majority imposed for the sole purpose of furthering the interests or serving the convenience… 
of persons other than the child himself…’2  Nor was evidence cited in support of the assertion 
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by Miss P M Claisse, Assistant Secretary to the Board, in oral evidence to the Committee, 
that if the age of twenty-one were retained as the age of majority ‘it would be for the 
protection of people other than the young’.3 (It should be said that the Board actually had 
little to say about contracts in its submission, which was focussed mainly on the issue of the 
right to marry without parental or judicial consent.) 
It will be the argument of this article that it was not the case that the concept of 
infancy was maintained as an oppressive tool of control over the young or that it was 
disadvantageous to the young and for the benefit only of others.  Although the law might 
restrict contractual capacity of different groups for reasons of social or economic control on 
the one hand, or else from a desire to protect members of the group on the other, it is 
submitted that the evidence in this instance, at least, points strongly to a policy imperative to 
protect infants. That it may be necessary to exercise some degree of control in order to 
protect is not surprising.  After all, a parent wishing to protect her toddler from the dangers of 
traffic is likely to achieve this result by carefully controlling the child’s movements in or near 
the road: control is the means, but protection is the motive.  The primary motive of the law on 
incapacity in relation to infants was to protect minors, perhaps ‘from themselves’, as Duncan 
Kennedy put it.4 
We have chosen the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the focus of our study 
because much of the case law on infants’ capacity was made during that period and a number 
of Parliamentary steps in this field were also taken in this time.  We allow ourselves, 
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however, some latitude in bringing in authorities falling outside our time-frame where we 
think it useful, but we stop at the famous case of Nash v Inman5 in 1908, by which time the 
law may be said to have reached its apogee. 
We will begin by very briefly explaining the reasons for the age of majority having 
been at twenty-one years at all, before examining the law as it was, chiefly under the 
headings of the concept of ‘necessaries’, for which infants could make binding arrangements, 
and of infant employment (actually, another category of ‘necessity’ so far as the law was 
concerned, but usefully considered separately for the sake of clarity and digestibility). We 
hope, thereby, to shed some light on the law’s motives in restricting infants’ capacity. 
 
The Age of Majority 
Different countries, at different times, have had different ages of majority.  This suggests 
either some degree of arbitrariness in the setting of a particular age, or that different places 
and different times have different imperatives to serve.  Of course, both may well be true.  
What is encompassed within the notion of being ‘of full age’ also differs from one legal 
system to another.  Our concern here is, however, with contractual capacity and we will 
endeavour to avoid straying too far from this. 
The Latey Report, already alluded to above, includes an account of how the law 
developed on this point, but rather than simply refer the reader to the Report, we will 
summarize that account here.   
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According to Latey, ‘Roman historians state that the barbarians reckoned their young 
were old enough to carry arms and be counted as grown up at 15.’6  Fifteen became the age 
of majority in Britain and across Northern Europe during the 9th to 11th centuries ‘…though 
not specifically linked with fighting ability’.7  Changes in the techniques and equipment of 
warfare, however, led to some revision of views as to when a young man was able to fight.  
The Normans had developed an approach to mounted fighting, involving heavy armour and 
heavy swords and lances, which required greater physical development and,8  
By the time of Magna Carta the age for those holding in knight service had been raised to 21, and there 
is strong authority for the view that this was directly linked with the ability to hold up a heavy suit of 
armour and lift a lance or sword at the same time. 
The Report cites Sainte Palaye: ‘the profession of arms demanded an ability and strength not 
to be acquired until the age of 21.’9  It goes on to cite Pollock and Maitland to the effect that 
burgesses and tenants in socage continued to come of age at fifteen, while tenants by knight 
service did not come of age until twenty-one; however, ‘…gradually … the knightly majority 
is becoming the majority of the common law…’10 
Military tenures were abolished by the Tenures Abolition Act 1660, which also 
provided that fathers could appoint guardians of their heirs until the age of twenty-one, 
because otherwise the conversion of military tenancies into socage would have put those 
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heirs into their property at the age of fifteen, with risks that were and are all too obvious.  So, 
twenty-one years became, by degrees, the age of majority in English law. 
The Report goes on to point out that however grotesque it might seem that the age of 
majority in the Latey Committee’s world of jet aeroplanes, lava lamps and mini-skirts should 
be determined by the weight of armour in Norman England, this did not necessarily mean it 
was not as good an age as any to set the bar on contractual and other legal autonomy.11 
 
The Law on Infancy 
As already indicated, we will divide our discussion on the law relating to infancy in the Long 
18th century and the 19th century, into two, accepting that the division of the subject matter is 
somewhat artificial.  We will begin by considering how the law sought to uphold its general 
rule in a way that did not make all contracting impossible, in such a way as to create undue 
inconvenience in the lives of infants and their parents, through the means of the doctrine of 
‘necessaries’.  We will exclude from that discussion the question of what we might broadly 
term ‘employment contracts’, which we will then proceed to discuss separately.  However, it 
seems apparent that contracts of service or apprenticeship, like contracts made for education 
or healthcare, were to an extent seen as ‘necessary’ for the wellbeing of the infant him- or 
herself (in order to earn a living and/or suitably to occupy their destined place in society), so 
the principle behind the enforceability of these contracts was not really different, even if the 
legal rules by which governed that enforceability were. Before concluding, we will also 
briefly touch on statutory intervention felt necessary from the second half of the 19th century. 
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‘Necessaries’ 
The origins of the doctrine of necessaries can be traced to the fifteenth century, where it was 
held that ‘when an infant within age has quid pro quo he will be bound by law… when he 
buys clothes for his body, he will be charged by action of debt, because these things he must 
of necessity have.’12 Consequently, items which were deemed to be ‘necessary’ for an infant, 
such as clothes and food, were found to bind him at common law.  In cases where an infant 
was sued for goods supplied on credit, whereof some were necessaries and others not, then 
where there was an entire contract the infant would be bound by none of it:  Stocks v 
Wilson.13  
The determination of what amounted to necessaries can essentially be divided into 
four linked questions: what sort of things could be necessary?; was the infant already 
provided?; who was to prove which facts?; and what were the respective roles of the judge 
and the jury?  Obviously, as civil juries began to fall into disuse outside specialist areas, the 
last question ceased to matter in the form in which we put it, though it would still be relevant 
on appeal, of course, as determining whether a particular question was a matter of law or one 
of fact. 
We will discuss necessaries under three headings. The first will focus on the subject 
matter of contract, but it will be seen that it is by no means possible to separate out the four 
questions entirely as they are often thoroughly mixed together in any one case, so in this 
section we will discuss the cases in general terms across all four questions where they arise.  
The second and third headings consider, respectively, the relevance of existing provision, 
which discusses the position in relation to a defendant who already had ample goods of the 
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type in question at the time the plaintiff supplied him or her, and questions of proof.  The 
discussion under this last heading will consist of a summary of who had to prove what and to 
whom (judge or jury).   
 
Subject matter of the contract 
In Mackarell v Bachelor14 it was held that the decision as to what constituted necessaries was 
one for the judge. Here, it was held that ‘suits of sattin [sic] and velvet cannot be necessary 
for an infant, although he be a gentleman’.15 (The infant defendant, who had had £44 worth 
of clothing, was a gentleman of the chamber to the Earl of Essex, so the plaintiff’s case had 
been, in effect, that this was work-gear.)  We shall see later how the attitude of the courts 
with regard to such items changed as the meaning of ‘necessaries’ underwent significant 
development, particularly in relation to the kind of items which could be deemed ‘necessary’ 
to those infants from a higher social class.   
Further, in Aoliffe v Archdale16  it was held that a penal bond executed to pay for food 
and drink was void. The plaintiff had paid out for these and the infant executed a bond to 
recompense him in the sum of £10, or £20 in default.  It was held that if the bond had been 
for the exact amount the plaintiff had paid out for the infant’s benefit then it would have been 
enforceable against the infant, but because of the penalty, the whole bond was bad.  While 
this finding appears to have been based upon the rationale that a penal bond can never be in a 
minor’s interests, it has been argued that the old cases do not bear this out as the reason for 
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the apparently well-established rule that infants were not bound by penal bonds.17 Reeve, for 
instance, concludes that, in exploring the reasoning that a penal bond is not binding upon an 
infant as it causes him greater injury, it proved impossible to find ‘any judicial decision 
which establishes such a rule’.18  Cases in which the court has concluded that an infant 
cannot be bound for the execution of a penal bond merely restate the principle, as is so 
common in old reports, so it is really impossible to state with any confidence what the real 
basis for the rule was.19   
The case of Dale v Copping20 in 1610 is another relatively early instance of a ruling 
on the question of what amounted to necessaries and expanded the scope of authority on what 
the courts would allow, by finding that a contract to pay for a cure for illness (‘falling 
sickness’ or epilepsy in this case) could bind an infant: 21   
Clearly the action well lieth against the defendant, and this nonage by him alledged by him at the time 
of the promise made, is not material, for that this shall be taken as a contract, and that to be for a thing 
in the nature of necessity to be done for him, and the same as necessary as if it had been a promise by 
him made for his meat, drink, or apparel, and in all such cases his promise is good, and shall bind him.’  
The defendant pleaded his infancy in an attempt to avoid being bound by the contract. 
Williams J dismissed this point and repeated the principle, ‘although he were within age at 
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the time of his promise by him made for such necessaries, and his nonage not at all material, 
and so in this case here his promise shall as well bind him, as in the other cases, the reason of 
the law being the same, and this cure being of as great necessity for him’. It is submitted that 
the finding that a minor ought to be bound for medical treatment is significant in that it is one 
of the first instances in which the court expanded upon the definition of necessaries since the 
earliest known instances, in the 15th century. The court seems not to have known of a 
previous instance of medical treatment being held to be necessary for an infant so as to make 
his promise to pay for it binding, and the present authors are not able to locate one either.  
What subsequently became allowed as medical treatment might surprise a modern reader, 
however. For instance, in Hart v Prater22 a horse was held to constitute a necessary on 
medical grounds, as the infant had been instructed by a doctor to take exercise on horseback, 
which must prompt speculation as to whether even the sort of medical treatment considered 
necessary might vary according to the patient’s social and economic position. 
Ive v Chester23 gives a further early instance of a case regarding fancy clothing, in this 
case a very fashionable and expensive cloak and pair of velvet hose, which had been specially 
made for the minor.   The court held that they may constitute necessaries and thus be 
recoverable on an assumpsit, but such items must be ‘necessary and convenient for him… 
according to his estate and degree’.24 The court did not allow recovery in this case, but the 
reason given was that it had not been specially pleaded by the plaintiff that these were 
necessary for the defendant and this fact was required to be specially pleaded,25 so we do not 
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know whether the defendant’s ‘estate and degree’ were such as demanded or warranted so 
luxurious a wardrobe. 
It may be objected that in Mackarell v Bachelor26 it had been held that luxurious 
clothes could not be necessaries even for a gentleman of the chamber of the Earl of Essex, so 
that there was some sense of an absolute ceiling on what was ‘necessary’ for an infant of any 
estate or degree. However, Mackarell v Bachelor had been decided in the 16th century, when 
there was still some feeling against excess of dress and display even among the upper-classes 
and sumptuary laws forbidding such excess had still been in force in England, not being 
repealed until (for most of them) 1603.  In 1800, Lord Kenyon CJ, giving judgment in the 
case of Hands v Slaney,27 held that the trial judge, Chambre B, at Warwick Assizes had 
correctly left to the jury the question of whether a livery for the servant of an infant army 
captain might be a necessary and the jury was entitled so to find:28 
[A]s to the other article furnished, namely, the livery, I cannot say that it was not necessary for a 
gentleman in the defendant's situation to have a servant; and if it were proper for him to have one, it 
was equally necessary that the servant should have a livery. The general rule is clear, that infants are 
liable for necessaries, according to their degree and station in life. This defendant was placed in a 
situation which required such an attendant: therefore, however inclined I am in general to protect 
infants against improvident contracts, I think that this case falls within the fair liability which the law 
imposes on infants of being bound for necessaries, which is a relative term, according to their station in 
life.     
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This judgment was relied upon by counsel for the plaintiff in Peters v Fleming.29 This 1840 
case concerned a Cambridge undergraduate, the eldest son of a wealthy gentleman and 
Member of Parliament.  The defendant ran up a bill of some £8.0.6d with the plaintiff 
jeweller for various rings, pins and a watch-chain. 
The jeweller brought suit; the defendant pleaded first that he was not indebted and 
secondly his infancy; the plaintiff joined issue on the first plea and replied on the second that 
the items were necessaries for someone of the defendant’s ‘degree, estate and condition’.  
The case came on for trial before Vaughan J and a jury at the Summer Assizes for 
Cambridgeshire.  Vaughan J left to the jury the question of whether the articles were 
necessaries and the jury having found that they were, the judge then directed them to return a 
verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed, but gave leave to the defendant to move 
to enter a nonsuit.  This was duly done by the defendant’s counsel and the case came before 
Parke, Alderson, Gurney and Rolfe, BB, in the Exchequer of Pleas.  It is interesting to note as 
an aside that the defendant in this trivial affair of £8.0.6d was represented by no less than Sir 
William Follett QC, MP, former and future Solicitor-General and future Attorney-General 
and, according to the plaque below his bust at the Devon and Exeter Institution (he was a son 
of Exeter, an alumnus of its grammar school and the city’s Member of Parliament) ‘the 
greatest advocate of the century’.  Sir William led Mr Biggs Andrews, who had represented 
the defendant at assizes and Mr Frederick (or Frederic) Gunning, a Cambridge native who 
was the author of a treatise on the law of tolls.30 A formidable team, but it did him little good: 
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the court held unanimously for the plaintiff, discharging the rule nisi for a nonsuit.  The judge 
had been entitled to leave to the jury the question of whether the items were necessaries and 
the jury were entitled so to find, at least in respect of the watch-chain and the seal-engraved 
ring and possibly also the two pins.  The finding on the other rings seems to have been 
regarded as erroneous, but it made no difference to the outcome as far as the court was 
concerned on this occasion, as the plaintiff could clearly not be nonsuited in the 
circumstances. 
Alderson B commented, in an interruption of the defence argument, that when 
considering what is a necessary item of dress, this ‘…may mean those things without which 
the party would lose caste in society’.31  So that breast-pins might be necessaries, though this 
would be conditioned as to quantity, since ‘…if twenty breast-pins had been supplied, they 
could scarcely be necessary’.32   
 In his judgment, Parke B observed that it was ‘perfectly clear’ that ‘from the earliest 
time down to the present, the word necessaries was not confined, in its strict sense, to such 
articles as were necessary to the support of life, but extended to articles fit to maintain the 
particular person in the state, station, and degree in life in which he is’.33  
Jewellers were concerned again in Elkington & Co. Ltd v Amery,34 which involved 
the supply of engagement and wedding rings, which were found to be necessaries.  In the 
case of Jenner v Walker,35 Cockburn CJ, suggested that jewellery (not engagement or 
                                            
31 (1840) 6 M & W 42 at 45; 151 ER 314. 
32 Above, n 31.  See further below in the discussion on existing provision. 
33 Above, n 31 at 46-47. 
34 [1936] 2 All ER 86. 
35 (1868) 19 LT Rep (NS) 398. 
wedding rings) destined to be presents for a bride were ‘very natural’36 coming from 
someone of some thousands a year (albeit that the infant actually only had £700-£1,000 a 
year), and would be necessaries, though not the same items intended for some other female.  
In the same case, he took the view that a ‘blue morocco patent frame betting book with richly 
gilt pins’ could not be necessary (though perhaps a less opulent betting book might be).37  
While it was clearly not the Chief Justice’s intention to suggest that something being or not 
being ‘very natural’ is the litmus of necessity, it could be urged at least that a wife or fiancée 
may feel that such gifts were necessary incidents of the relationship.  There is no difficulty in 
taking both the station and degree in life in which the defendant finds himself in general 
terms together with some particular circumstances operative at the moment of the disputed 
transaction,  for example, an anticipated marriage as in Elkington & Co v Amery,38 or a state 
of national emergency as in Coates v Wilson.39 
Conversely, it was held in Nash v Inman40 that fancy waistcoats for an undergraduate 
were not necessaries in the particular case.  In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeal 
followed the principle laid down in Peters v Fleming, that such items may be appropriate for 
the infant if they were suitable to his ‘state… and degree in life’.41 The main basis for the 
decision of the court appears to be that the infant’s father gave evidence, that was believable 
and not contradicted, that his son was amply supplied with clothes, so it was a question, 
mainly, of quantity, but  Buckley LJ, focussing on whether ‘the goods were suitable to the 
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condition in life of the infant’,42 said that the clothing was ‘of an extravagant and ridiculous 
style having regard to the position of the boy’.43  (The defendant was the son of a successful 
architect with a house in Hampstead and a country pile near Havant, and had been educated 
at Uppingham before going up to Trinity College, Cambridge.) 
A similar position was adopted in Ryder v Wombwell44 where ‘a pair of solitaires or 
ornamental studs, worn as the fastenings of the wristbands of a shirt, which…were made of 
crystals set in gold and ornamented with diamonds, representing a horseshoe in which the 
nails were rubies’45 were not necessaries for the infant in the case. Willes J said that,46   
The question in such cases is not whether the expenditure is one which an infant, in the defendant's 
position, could not properly incur. There is no doubt that an infant may buy jewelry [sic] or plate, if he 
has the money to pay and pays for it. But the question is whether it is so necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining himself in his station that he should have these articles.  
The question for the court therefore, was not whether the infant could afford the items, but 
rather whether such items were essential to him in his current position in life.  The court held 
that such extravagant pieces could not possibly be necessary for the infant. 
Expensive dinners were similarly regarded as being incapable of constituting 
necessaries, as we can see in Wharton v Mackenzie.47 Whilst the court in Wharton was 
willing to accept that the young gentleman was of suitable means and standing to host such 
dinners, Wightman J stated that ‘the articles of which this bill is composed cannot be 
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necessaries if they cannot be supplied without giving credit.’48 That is a problematic line of 
argument, since the question of necessary versus non-necessary goods generally only arises 
when the goods or services are supplied on credit.  An infant was quite competent to make 
cash transactions.49An infant’s contracts were unenforceable as a general rule, rather than 
void, so disputes only arose where some part of the contract remained executory: invariably 
in sales of goods cases, this was payment by the infant, so that the seller sued to recover the 
price of goods supplied on credit and the purchaser pleaded infancy in defence. 
It is to the credit of the judges in these cases, however, that often the application of 
common sense and a more realistic approach seems to prevail over a rigid application of the 
law. Indeed, such was the reason for disallowing the young undergraduate in Wharton v 
Mackenzie from being held liable for luxury foodstuffs, as Lord Denman CJ explained, ‘with 
respect to the articles here supplied, it is an outrage to common sense to say that they can 
possibly be necessaries’.50 
Sometimes, a very particular context might play a role.  In Coates v Wilson51 Lord 
Ellenborough held a military uniform for a volunteer corps to be a necessary as a 
consequence of the number of men who had enlisted for military service around this time.52 It 
was only right that in ‘these perilous times’ an infant ought to be able to contract for clothing 
which was essential for duties undertaken ‘for defence of the country’.53   
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 Existing provision 
The question of quantity was also clearly relevant to the question of whether what was 
supplied under the contract fell within the category of ‘necessaries’. We saw above that this 
question was alluded to by Alderson B in Peters v Fleming when he observed that a breast-
pin might be a necessary, but twenty breast-pins could not be.54  There are numerous 
references in the case law to the issue of whether an infant was already sufficiently supplied 
and whether this was indeed relevant to whether the goods were necessary.  There seems to 
have been doubt about this, on occasion, with one view being that the fact of the infant being 
already well-supplied with goods of the same sort was only relevant if the seller knew that 
this was so, and that the seller was under no obligation to take steps to find out. It was 
suggested by counsel in various cases that it should not be necessary for the tradesman to 
make active enquiries.  Such was the argument of the plaintiff’s counsel in Ford v 
Fothergill.55 In this case a young man’s excesses brought the disapproval of Lord Kenyon.  
In an assumpsit for work and labour as a tailor, the plaintiff sued the defendant for the price 
(not stated in the report) of a coat, waistcoat and two pairs of breeches, ordered by the 
defendant for delivery to him at the Grecian Coffee House.  These clothes were in addition to 
a great many others supplied by other tailors in an extravagant spending spree.  The 
defendant’s father had paid various other tailors off that same year, 1793.  At Nisi Prius, the 
plaintiff’s counsel argued against the suggestion that his client ought to have instituted 
enquiries: 
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Mingay, for the plaintiff, contended, that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to traverse the town to 
enquire the defendant’s fortune and character.  He came to him as a man of fortune and figure, 
introduced and recommended by a gentleman of fortune.  If the plaintiff thought them necessary for his 
state and degree, that would maintain the issue.  In the way he appeared to the plaintiff he could not 
know but that he had an estate of £500 per annum. 
The argument, however, did not find favour with Lord Kenyon CJ, who directed the jury that 
the plaintiff could and should have made enquiries.  The plaintiff, said Lord Kenyon, ought to 
have ‘…gone to [the defendant’s] father and enquired of him whether he was in want of these 
clothes’.56  Indeed, the circumstance of the defendant living in a coffee house seemed to his 
Lordship to be suggestive of an unwary nature (we assume he meant a tendency to 
extravagance) as well as offering an opportunity of making enquiries both of people at the 
coffee house and of the boy’s father, so that it seemed that the plaintiff perhaps should have 
been specially on his guard as well as having it more easily in his power to control his risks. 
That the jury did not apparently agree with Lord Kenyon does not really affect the view we 
must take of the law as it then stood, however.  What the case also tells us is, that the 
question of what was necessary was a matter for the jury, which was also fundamental in 
Maddox v Miller,57 considered in more detail below. 
Further instances can be found over a long period of time.  In Barnes & Co v Toye58 
the Divisional Court ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge had erred in 
directing the jury that it did not matter how many clothes the defendant already had, in 
considering whether those supplied by the plaintiff tailors were necessaries.  Lopes J drew an 
analogy with a watch, saying that ‘a watch may be prima facie in some cases a necessary, but 
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if it turned out that the infant was already supplied with a watch or watches, the one ordered 
could not be a necessary’,59 and found that the jury were entitled to take into account the fact 
that the minor may already be sufficiently supplied with the goods when determining whether 
a particular item was necessary: ‘Evidence as to the amount of clothes the defendant 
possessed at the time when the order relied on was given was admissible, and the jury should 
have been told that in arriving at a conclusion whether the goods supplied by the plaintiffs 
were necessaries or not, they should consider whether the defendant was already sufficiently 
supplied.’60 This decision seemed to the Divisional Court to involve a dissent from the then 
recent decision in Ryder v Wombwell, but it is not evident that it really did.  In Ryder the 
defendant had been supplied with expensive items of jewellery on credit.  He had a great 
many other items of the sort.  The Lord Chief Baron at trial had left it to the jury whether the 
items were of such a type and quality as was necessary to the defendant, given his exalted 
social position, but directed them to ignore the fact that he had a great many like items 
already in his possession.  The Court of Exchequer Chamber held that the question of 
necessary-or-not was one for the jury, but that the judge should withhold the question from 
the jury if there was not sufficient evidence on which a jury could reasonably reach a 
conclusion that the items were necessary.  The Lord Chief Baron had erred in holding that the 
defendant’s evidence that he already possessed plenty of jewellery should not be considered 
by the jury, in light of evidence that the plaintiffs had not been aware of this fact.  In so far as 
this conclusion is concerned, the Divisional Court in Barnes & Co v Toye, in finding, as it 
did, that a defendant was entitled to adduce evidence that he was already well-supplied with 
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items of the sort alleged to have been necessaries, was not at odds with the Court of 
Exchequer Chamber in the earlier case. 
This view, that the actual existing provision of the defendant was entirely relevant and 
the trader was on notice that he dealt with an infant on credit at his peril, for if it turned out 
that the infant was already adequately supplied then the trader could not recover, is amply 
supported by other authorities over a significant period, for instance, Bainbridge v 
Pickering,61 Cook v Deaton,62 Story v Pery,63 Steedman v Rose64 and, of course, the 
extremely well-known case, already mentioned above, of Nash v Inman.65 In this latter case, 
the court found that the tradesman bringing the claim against the infant had to show, ‘first, 
that the goods were suitable to the condition in life of the infant; and, secondly, that they 
were suitable to his actual requirements at the time or, in other words, that the infant had not 
at the time an adequate supply from other sources.’66 
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Dalton v Gib67 is a rare instance of the judges finding that the circumstances were 
such that the trader need not have made enquiries as to the circumstances of the defendant, 
including her existing sufficiency or otherwise of goods of the description supplied.  In this 
case, the defendant was a woman of twenty years of age, who lived with her mother rather 
extravagantly at an hotel in Hanover Square, a fashionable address in London’s West End, 
travelling around the city in a carriage, when in fact the pair were possessed of few funds and 
the mother was living apart from her husband, who was living in Calais.  The defendant 
contracted for the purchase of silks to the value of £35 and took some with her in the 
carriage, which waited outside the plaintiff’s shop, with the defendant’s mother inside, whilst 
the rest were delivered to the hotel, again with the mother available to supervise.  All the 
judges, Tindal CJ, Vaughan, Bosanquet and Erskine JJ, agreed that the usual rule was that the 
trader dealt with an infant at his own peril and was on notice to make enquiries as to whether 
the infant was already sufficiently supplied, but that the circumstance of appearing in a 
carriage, with her mother there when she took some of the goods with her, and living at the 
hotel with her mother, rendered enquiries superfluous.  This does not seem really out of line 
with the rest of the cases: the general rule is acknowledged and here the only person of whom 
the tradesman could have been expected to make enquiries was the mother, and she was 
present both at the shop and the hotel and can be taken to have approved the purchases, 
implicitly signifying that the additional silks being bought were necessary for her daughter. 
 
Proof 
The proper pleading in cases of infant defendants to actions on their contracts, involved the 
plaintiff pleading the contract and the defendant’s indebtedness, the defendant meeting this 
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with a plea that they were not indebted and were not of age and then for the plaintiff to plead 
that the subject matter of the contract was something that was necessary to the defendant. 
This fact of the necessary nature of the goods or services supplied had to be specially 
pleaded, therefore, as we saw in Ive v Chester.68 
The position on the balance between what is a matter of fact and what a matter of law 
seems to have changed over time.  As we have seen, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, the judges appear to have regarded the whole question of what is necessary for a 
particular infant as a question of law. Such was clearly the case in Mackerell v Bachelor,69 
and also appears to have been the assumption in Dale v Copping.70  Equally clearly, by the 
end of the eighteenth century the question of ‘necessary or not?’ had become in some sense 
partly one for the judge and partly for the jury, as we saw in Hands v Slaney,71 and again later 
in Jenner v Walker.72   However, the division between judicial competence and jury 
competence was that the judge had to decide as a matter of law whether there was or was not 
sufficient evidence adduced upon the basis of which a reasonable jury, properly directed, 
could possibly conclude that the goods or services were in fact necessary for the defendant.   
This point, indeed, had puzzled Cockburn CJ in Jenner, because he had only an 
imperfect account of what had just been decided in Ryder v Wombwell,73 from which he had 
the impression that the Exchequer Chamber had decided that the question of whether or not 
an item was necessary was one for the judge.  The Chief Justice was somewhat scathing of 
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the suggestion, arguing that Baron Bramwell, who hated smoking, would find a cigar case not 
a necessary, while another judge might find it to be necessary.  Such matters of personal 
judgment were best left to a jury in Cockburn CJ’s opinion, though he felt bound by what he 
had understood the judgment in Ryder to have been.74 
The judge, therefore, had, as we might put it, ‘first bite of the cherry’, in determining 
whether something was capable of being found by a reasonable jury to be necessary. Once he 
had decided that goods of the character concerned were capable of being necessaries for the 
defendant in the case, it was properly left to the jury (as Lord Kenyon found that Chambre B 
had done at Warwick Assizes in Hands v Slaney) whether in that particular case the actual 
goods supplied were necessaries, which would include the question of whether the infant was 
sufficiently supplied already. 
The case of Maddox v Miller,75 already alluded to, furnishes a useful illustration of 
the extent to which the judge’s ‘first bite’ was sometimes reduced to little more than a lick.  
The defendant was the son of a clergyman who lived in Gloucestershire, but the defendant 
had been living, at the time of the contracts involved, in Stourport-on-Severn, where he was 
employed by a substantial bargemaster at a salary that did not appear in evidence.  In August 
1809 he had sent for the plaintiff tailors to attend him at a coffee house (this was mentioned 
specifically, in relation to the fact that he had not been introduced to them by his father), and 
between then and September 1810 bespoke of him clothes to the value of £18 2s 6d. In 
September 1810 he paid £15 towards his outstanding bill and between October that year and 
February 1811 was allowed to order further clothes, some extra-deluxe clothes suitable to a 
nobleman while others were clothes of the ordinary sort supplied to a gentleman, amounting 
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to a further £16 4s 6d, giving a total amount owing after that date of £19 7s 0d. At the time of 
the delivery of the clothes the defendant was an infant.  He was subsequently sued and the 
case came on at Worcester Assizes before Bayley J and a jury.  The defendant pleaded his 
infancy and the tailor pleaded in replication that the goods were necessaries.  It was objected 
that insufficient evidence had been adduced for the plaintiff that the defendant was not 
already adequately supplied with clothes (or that these clothes were suitable for his state and 
condition, or what his income was) for the case to go to the jury.  Bayley J, in some 
uncertainty, nonsuited the plaintiffs (rather ironically).  A rule nisi to set aside the nonsuit 
having been obtained, the case came before Lord Ellenborough CJ, who made the rule 
absolute, holding that there was enough to go to the jury. 
We saw earlier, in the case of Ford v Fothergill76 that the jury might well go against a 
strong direction from the judge. Here, Lord Kenyon commented in very clear terms against 
the failure of the plaintiff tailor to make enquiries as to the position of the defendant and 
whether the defendant was already sufficiently supplied with clothes. It took a firm-minded 
jury to disregard the views of the Lord Chief Justice and find in favour of the tailor. This tells 
us two things. First, it shows that the question of sufficiency of supply was a matter for the 
jury (and perhaps also that it was difficult at times to disentangle the question of sufficiency 
from the issue of the plaintiff’s duty to enquire, if such a duty truly existed, upon which the 
foregoing argument has clearly cast doubt).  Secondly, when taken in conjunction with other 
cases, such as Peters v Fleming,77 in which the jury appears to have found against the weight 
of judicial opinion (and/or common sense) that luxurious goods were indeed necessary to the 
defendant and he should be held liable for them, we have an impression that juries, which 
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perhaps included a good many local tradesmen, were not as inclined as the judges were to 
indulge the weaknesses of apparently well-off youngsters and protect them from themselves. 
This second factor, moreover, seems to point to the stated reasons of the judges for 
disallowing claims on infants’ contracts, namely the protection of the infants themselves, 
being indeed the real reason and policy of the law, as this article argues. 
 
Employment and Training 
Contracts for the supply of goods or services on credit are one sort of contract involving an 
element of futurity or continuing obligation, which therefore raised questions about the 
capacity of a would-be infant contractor.  They arose quite frequently since infancy lasted 
into the period in life in which a young person might be an undergraduate, or have entered 
upon a naval or military career, or be otherwise living separately from his or her parents or 
guardians.  Infants, however, were also very frequently employed or apprenticed, which also 
involved contracting with a degree of futurity and therefore also raise the problem of 
capacity. In this section we will consider how the courts dealt with contracts of this character 
and see what light that sheds on the question of the law’s policy or motivations. (Although 
the reports appear to contain rather fewer instances of actions brought in relation to these 
types of contracts.78) 
Before doing so, however, some note of caution must necessarily be sounded, 
regarding the risks of viewing the past through the lenses of the present.  While infancy lasted 
until the age of twenty-one so that some of the contracts one is dealing with in relation to 
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infants’ employment therefore deal with those who would be of employable age today, a 
great deal of employment and nearly all apprenticeships in the period under consideration 
here involve those whom we still regard as children.  In the contemporary West, we tend to 
take it for granted that child labour is a Bad Thing.  The Whig theory of history as applied to 
young people and work assumes that this is the case and that the unfolding of history over the 
18th, 19th and 20th centuries has been, so far as this issue is concerned, the story of an 
inexorable improvement in the shape of the gradual abolition of child labour and the pushing 
back of the point (still going on even in Britain) of transition from education to working 
life.79  This was not at all axiomatic to our ancestors, however.  Dorothy George, in her brief 
but excellent chapter on ‘Child Labour and Apprenticeship’ in England in Transition, notes 
that Daniel Defoe had regarded high levels of child labour, from as young an age as possible, 
as his ‘chief criterion of prosperity’,80 citing his enthusiastic statement in reference to the 
district around Halifax that ‘hardly any thing [sic] above four years old but its hands are 
sufficient to itself’81 and in respect of Norwich that ‘the very children after four or five years 
of age, could every one earn their own bread’.82  George likewise cites an American 
commentator visiting Halifax in 1777 who83 
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…watched some fifteen children making wire cards for wool-carding ‘which employment’, he noted in 
his diary, ‘not only keeps their little minds from vice but … takes a heavy burden from their poor 
parents.’ That was the traditional and unquestioned attitude towards the labour of children. 
The kindly Parson Woodforde had child servants in his house, as the following reference in 
his diary for 1779 shows: 84 
Sepbr. 3, Tuesday. […] I hired, Yesterday, one Henry Daines, a Boy of 13. Years old, in the place of 
Barnard Woodcock, who leaves me at Michaelmas next being too old for his Place & can better 
himself.  I liked the Boy very well, having an open, honest countenance to all appearances, his Mother 
who came with him, seemed to be a good kind of Woman & very Motherly.  I gave the Boy, on hiring 
him 0.1.0.  Dinner to day, rost Beef & Plumb Pudding… 
The entry for 13 January 1800 shows that Daines was paid two guineas per annum.85  That 
the children of the labouring classes should be themselves labouring from a young age was 
not, then, regarded as a matter of regret, rather as part of the ordinary course of things, not 
only by their employers and by commentators but also by their parents. 
There is also a risk in the other direction.  Much child labour was done under articles 
of apprenticeship.  Apprenticeships tend to be seen today in an extremely positive light.  Paid, 
on-the-job training for a (usually skilled) future career.  The temptation is to assume that this 
was the case in the past, when apprenticeships were much more a part of the everyday 
experience of the vast majority of young people, often gilded by the reflected romantic light 
of the mediaeval guild system, with its ‘mysteries’ and its grades of apprentice, journeyman 
and master.  Such a view is also highly misleading and hazardous to a proper understanding 
of child/youth labour in our period.  Apprenticeships varied greatly between trades, with 
apprenticeships to substantial merchants or to professional men being very much educative in 
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nature, with good conditions for the apprentice and good future prospects (including the 
possibility in some instances of marrying his master’s daughter and eventually taking over 
the business).  Such apprenticeships, however, came with a hefty fee payable by the 
apprentice’s parents or guardians to the master, which might be £100 for an apprenticeship to 
a surgeon or as much as £1000 to a great merchant.  At the more usual level for the bulk of 
the population, a fee of perhaps £5 would be payable on indenturing to a weaver or small-
time shoemaker.86  George observes that ‘with a small fee [the apprentice] would be an 
unpaid servant; with a large one he would expect to be a pupil.’87 
Equally, even where the apprentice was mostly an unpaid servant, the arrangement 
was not necessarily all that advantageous to the master, either.  George notes that,88 
[A]t the beginning the child was a nuisance, he spoiled material, he needed supervision, his appetite 
was large.  The master expected to be repaid for the unprofitable early years when the boy (or girl) had 
learned his trade.  But as soon as this happened, the apprentice seldom failed to resent having to work 
for his master without pay and, it should be remembered, for an unlimited number of hours a day.  
This often led to apprentices behaving badly and spoiling work deliberately to induce the 
master to agree to cancel the indentures.  A not infrequent thing, such was the burden of a 
young apprentice, was for the master deliberately to mistreat the boy so as to force him to 
abscond. This was of course of no concern to the master, who simply recruited another young 
apprentice – and, naturally, the fee that went with it.89  
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At the lowest end of the scale, there were apprenticeships to trades so undesirable that 
no fee was payable at all, or else the master paid the parents.  Bottom of the pile was the 
chimney-sweep’s apprentice, the pitiable ‘climbing-boy’, for whom families themselves were 
paid by the masters.  Sometimes, such was the difficulty in finding a boy to do this work, 
large sums changed hands. Lane writes of a young boy who ‘claimed to have been kidnapped 
by a “little hunchbacked gentleman” who offered his mother £100 for him’.90  
It was not only boys who undertook apprenticeships.  Although less common, girls 
were quite often apprenticed; though given the limited number of positions in which a woman 
could work, young girls who completed apprenticeships often did so in more menial 
occupations. Indeed, it has been recorded that ‘of one girl bound at Norwich in 1653, it is said 
that she was to be educated in housewifery for seven years’.91 Dorothy George, commenting 
on how thin the pretence of teaching a trade often was, also cites the case of ‘a little girl 
[who] was bound as the drudge of a family of street hawkers living in a single room in a 
slum’ whose indentures of apprenticeship provide that she should be ‘taught the art of 
housewifery’.92  
Poor children, dependent on the parish, were in a different and usually worse 
situation. For such children apprenticeships were compulsory, as George explains, ‘under the 
Elizabethan Poor Law the children of poor parents were to be apprenticed by being billeted 
compulsorily upon the ratepayers of the parish to be farm servants or household servants, the 
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boys till they were twenty-four, the girls till twenty-one or marriage’.93 From the Poor Relief 
Act 1691 onwards, serving as an apprentice for at least 40 days established a right of 
settlement in the parish where it was served, meaning that parish officers were incentivized to 
indenture poor children to masters in another parish, because they thereby got permanently 
rid of them as possible claimants on their own parish’s poor rate.  While masters in a child’s 
own parish were obliged to accept poor apprentices, those in other parishes were not, so 
parish officers would have to pay the master in another parish, usually £5.  The payment 
seems to have been considered well worth it.94 
It is clear then, that when we speak of apprenticeships; we are referring to all manner 
of different arrangements, some of which were of benefit to the infant, others distinctly and 
sometimes egregiously exploitative. The contract was a regulated one, however, in the sense 
that where a master complained of an unruly or peculiarly ham-fisted apprentice, or an 
apprentice complained that he was not been taught a trade or was not correctly treated (which 
might be brutality, or might be, for instance, failing to supply the apprentice with proper 
clothing), either party might complain to Quarter Sessions and seek the cancellation of the 
indentures. Dorothy George cites the example of William Adams, who was apprenticed to a 
carpenter but complained to Quarter Sessions that he was not being taught that trade but 
instead had been made to ‘drive children about at fairs for half-pence in a little cart drawn by 
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dogs’ and that his master instead of supplying him with clothes had taken the clothes he 
already had from him and pawned them.95 
 
The Law on Apprenticeships 
The law was that an infant could be bound to a contract of apprenticeship, but that this was 
conditional on it being, looked at in the round, beneficial to the infant.  Such a contract could 
not be enforced against the infant in an action for breach of the contract.  Rather, as between 
the apprentice and the master, a status relationship was created, which was regulated by 
statute and common law.  That said, it was still a contract and a third party inducing the 
apprentice to breach the terms of their indentures was open to action for inducing breach of 
contract.  All of this can be gathered from the judgment of Fry LJ, sitting as an additional 
judge of the Chancery Division, in the celebrated case of De Francesco v Barnum & 
Others,96 familiar still to law students as an authority against specific performance of 
contracts of personal service. 
Briefly, De Francesco ran a highly reputed dance school in London.  He brought an 
action against P T Barnum, the famous impresario, a theatrical agent named Signor 
Parravicini, employed by Barnum to engage ballet-dancers for him, two infants, Ada and 
Helen Maude Parnell, De Francesco’s apprentices, and Mrs Elizabeth Parnell, mother of the 
two girls.  He began by moving in the Chancery Division for an injunction restraining the 
defendants from breaches of the apprenticeship indentures. These indentures were both 
entered into on 6 December 1886, when Ada was twelve years old and Helen Maude was 
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fourteen.  The two deeds were in the same terms.  They bound the girls as apprentices for 
seven years in, mostly, the usual terms as to obedience to the master, and so on.  But they had 
some unusual aspects.  The master was only to pay them anything if he used them for a 
performance.  He was under no obligation to provide any work for them (though he was 
obliged to provide instruction).  So they had no guarantee of any kind of income.  He was not 
liable for maintaining them in any way.  He was free to take them anywhere in the world, 
away from maternal care and out of the jurisdiction.  He could terminate the contract in each 
case at any time ‘after a fair trial’ on grounds that the girl in question was unsuited to the 
career.  There was no corresponding right of termination by the girls or their mother.  The 
girls, even when not employed by De Francesco, could not take other work without his 
written permission.  Neither could they marry.  Breach of any of the terms entitled De 
Francesco to terminate and claim liquidated damages in the sum of £50. 
Chitty J, hearing the motion for injunctions, refused them.  He held that without going 
into the question of whether or not the contracts were beneficial to the infants, he had to 
consider himself bound by the case of Gylbert v Fletcher,97 decided by the King’s Bench 
(Hyde CJ, Jones, Whitlock and Croke JJ) in the reign of Charles I, which states that:98  
[A]lthough an infant may voluntarily bind himself an apprentice, and if he continue apprentice for 
seven years may have the benefit to use his trade, yet neither at the common law nor [by statute] shall 
the covenant or obligation of an infant for his apprenticeship bind him.  But if he misbehave himself, 
the master may correct him in his service, or complain to a justice of the peace to have him punished, 
according to the statute.  But no remedy lieth against an infant on such a covenant… 
He noted that this case had been unchallenged authority ever since and was cited by the 
leading textbook writers, so he was unwilling to consider on an interim application whether 
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the authority might be overruled.99 After this, the Plaintiff ceased to seek any remedy against 
the infants and the matters to be considered at trial by Fry LJ concerned the question of 
whether the adult parties could be sued for inducing breach of contract.  If there was a valid 
contract, then it was clearly possible that Mrs Parnell, insofar as she co-operated in the 
engagement of the girls to perform for Mr Barnum at Olympia,100 and Mr Barnum and his 
agent Sgr Parravicini, insofar as, and from the time, they were aware of the relevant term of 
the indentures, could be liable for inducing breach.  Fry LJ did not have to go so far as 
deciding the facts, because he decided that the indentures themselves were void.  Although he 
noted the reputability of the plaintiff’s school, that the training might well be valuable and 
perhaps the best to be had in dancing, that the indentures were in some ways enlightened as 
with their provisions in relation to education, he held that, judged all in all, they were not in 
the girls’ interests.  The provisions described above as ‘unusual’ were highly one-sided.  
Although every contract would contain some terms favourable to one party only and some to 
the other party, the balance here was very heavily in De Francesco’s favour, to the extent that 
the deeds viewed in the round, and acknowledging that the arrangements would provide the 
girls with the means in due course of getting their living, were not to the net benefit of the 
infants.101 
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The rule that the covenants of an apprenticeship could not be enforced by action 
against an infant did not apply to mere contracts of employment, into which an infant might 
also enter.  This is evident from Chitty J’s discussion on the motion for injunctions in De 
Francesco v Barnum of the case Fellows v Wood.102 This being urged on him by counsel for 
De Francesco as an instance of the granting of an injunction for breach of an infant’s contract 
with his master.  Chitty J explained that in this case it appeared that not only was the 
defendant not an infant when his former master had sought an injunction to restrain him from 
taking his customers, having left his service without notice and in breach of contract both as 
to notice and as to non-competition, but also that this ‘was not a contract of apprenticeship; it 
was a mere contract of service’.103   
 
 
Contracts of service 
The position with contracts of service was also that infants were free to enter into such 
contracts which, unlike indentures of apprenticeship, were enforceable at law and in 
equity.104  Nevertheless, such contracts were only binding on an infant if they were of net 
benefit to him or her, which was also true of contracts incidental to employment contracts.  
Clements v London & North Western Railway Co.105 concerned a boy’s employment with the 
defendant railway company.  On joining the company’s service, he also signed up to an 
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insurance scheme, which would pay out in the event of an injury, whether or not the fault of 
the employer (only provided it was not the result of gross negligence on the part of the 
insured).  The employee contributed to the scheme from his wages, on a scale, and the 
employer also made a contribution.  The scheme provided that the employee, in joining the 
scheme, agreed to waive any claim against the employer in respect of personal injury in the 
course of his employment.  It was held that, in deciding whether the contract was binding 
upon the infant, ‘the answer to this proposition depends on whether, on the true construction 
of the contract as a whole, it was for his advantage’.106 Lord Esher held that where a contract 
is of benefit to the infant, it will be binding upon him. His Lordship came to the conclusion in 
this case that as ‘the risk of non-success owing to difficulty of proof, and the risk of obtaining 
but small advantage from a successful action, are both obviated by this agreement, under 
which, even if it is clear that there is no legal claim which could be enforced against the 
company, he is still entitled to compensation’,107 the infant therefore must derive some 
benefit from the contract and so ought to be held bound by it.  The converse also follows as 
A.L. Smith LJ explained, stating that it would be ‘unfair that he should be bound by it’108 if it 
were not benefiting him in any way.  
 
Conclusions 
So, we submit it can be fairly stated that whatever the rigours of a rougher-mannered age, 
when child labour was not only rife but generally seen as desirable or an inevitable part of 
life, we nevertheless see, at least when the higher courts become involved, a high bar being 
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set by the courts for contractual validity, the yardstick of which is benefit to the infant. 
Indentures of apprenticeship are struck down as void if not, on balance, beneficial to the 
infant.  Contracts of service are less common for infants, as infant labour is mainly engaged 
under at least the guise of apprenticeship, but these contracts, too, and contracts ancillary to 
them, are subject to a test of net benefit.  The broad conclusion the authors feel entitled to 
draw is that although the times were much harsher on the young than we care to contemplate 
today, and society generally less protective of children, the law itself, when called upon 
(which might only be possible, admittedly, for those with family, friends and financial 
resources), was paternalistic in its outlook and astute to weigh contracts of this sort and see 




Whilst common law principles afforded protection to infants buying goods and services on 
credit and in relation to training and employment, the law surrounding the repayment of a 
loan and moneys owed was less than satisfactory, having undergone little development, save 
that penal bonds were unenforceable against infants even before they were rendered generally 
void. 
It was doubtless commoner for an infant to require food, lodging, clothing, education 
or employment than to need to borrow money, so it makes sense that a more developed 
jurisprudence should have evolved in relation to the former transactions. However, the 
changing nature of the contracting landscape of infants saw the need to increase regulation 
with regard to the lending of money to an infant.  Mitchell Henry MP, who introduced the 
Infants’ Contracts Bill, which was to become the Infants’ Relief Act 1874, referred the House 
to ‘the extent to which the money-lenders' conspiracy was carried on against young men and 
boys by the issue in extraordinary numbers of circulars and letters tempting them to borrow 
money’.109 Such letters were sent to boys at boarding schools with a view of encouraging 
them to borrow money, with the result that young men were burdened with debts that they 
could not possibly repay. In an attempt to resolve this, the bill sought to protect ‘a young man 
who had been inveigled into the money-lender’s den…’110 
Clause 1 provided that:  
All contracts, whether by specialty, or by simple contract, henceforth entered into by infants for the 
repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for 
necessaries), and all accounts stated with infants, shall be absolutely void. 
while clause 2 prevented ratification and any retrospective enforcement of debt, once the 
infant became of full age: 
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay 
any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or 
contract made during infancy. 
Consequently, a lender would be unable to collect if he contracted with an infant, irrespective 
of any enquiries he may make as to age and any misrepresentation made by the infant in that 
regard.  The legislation clearly benefited the improvident infant, but it was seen by some as 
imposing too severe a restriction on tradesmen. Sir Massey Lopes MP questioned whether 
money-lenders were really that greater a risk to infants than a shopkeeper who, for example, 
sold goods to an infant knowing that he was not of full age, ‘were there not other classes 
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quite as bad – the unscrupulous shopkeepers, for example, who persuaded young men to 
order goods they did not want and could not pay for’.111 In spite of these objections the bill 
passed into law.  After much criticism, particularly of the difficulties of interpretation of the 
words ‘absolutely void’ (did this make it impossible for the infant to enforce such a contract 
for his own benefit?) the Act was repealed by s 1 of the Minors’ Contracts Act 1987.  In any 
event, the Act seems not to have solved the actual problem that had led to its introduction, 
viz. unscrupulous lenders targeting boys at public schools, because the issue of sending 
circulars to children, either promoting betting or offering loans, resulted in further legislation 
less than twenty years later. The Betting and Loans (Infants) Act 1892 made it illegal 
knowingly to send communications to infants inciting them to gamble or to borrow money.  
Knowledge of the recipient’s infancy was rebuttably presumed by  s 3 if the communication 
was sent to ‘any person at any university, college, school or other place of education’.  
Penalties included fines and/or imprisonment, ‘with or without hard labour’. 
The Latey Report recommended that the Infants Relief Act be repealed, which 
received support from academic commentators, for example Downey, who wrote that ‘the 
recommendations of the Committee on infants' contracts could usefully be implemented 
without delay, if only to get rid of the thoroughly unsatisfactory Infants Relief Act 1874’.112 
However, whilst the 1969 Act effected the reduction in the age of majority, it left the Infants 
Relief Act 1874 untouched. The Minors Contracts Act was enacted on 9 April 1987 and, as 
already noted, repealed the Infants Relief Act 1874 and also repealed the Betting and Loans 
(Infants) Act 1892. 
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Conclusions 
As explained in the Introduction to this article, the question of ‘for whose benefit did infants 
lack full contractual capacity?’ has been a contested one.  The Latey Committee observed 
that the then age of full capacity, twenty-one years of age, was arbitrary, but not necessarily 
wrong.  The committee had received and noted in its Report, however, evidence from the 
Church of England’s Board for Social Responsibility (which it is fair to say probably enjoyed 
more influence in the mid-1960s than today), that limits on the capacity of young people were 
not for their benefit, were for the benefit of others and were motivated by the desire of others 
to control the lives and actions of young people.113 The Report goes on in the following 
paragraph to state that this ‘is strongly supported by the evidence’,114 for which the 
committee cites, actually, no evidence and evidence for which is completely lacking in the 
Board’s submissions.  On the other hand, as we have seen, the judges deciding cases 
regarding contractual capacity, spoke quite distinctly in terms of protecting those same young 
people, whether from tradesmen on the make, or exploitative masters in the workplace, or 
just generally from themselves.  The legal realism of the 20th century has taught us to be 
sceptical of the language of judgments; to avoid assuming that a case had the outcome it did 
for the reasons stated by the judge. The present authors have had this ‘opinion scepticism’115 
very much in mind. We nevertheless feel forced to the view that the opinion put to the Latey 
Committee that the laws on infants’ capacity were framed and administered not in their 
interests but to control them in the interests of others, was not only (as already observed) 
unsupported by any evidence offered at the time, but ran contrary to the evidence we have 
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found in more than two centuries’ worth of case law and, incidentally in the late-19th century 
legislation.  Not only is the judicial rhetoric one of protection of infant parties, but the 
outcomes in terms of directions given by judges are strongly and consistently so.   
As the law on necessaries became both more developed and more nuanced by social 
standing and wealth, we see a lessening of the absoluteness of protection given to infants, in 
favour of some concession to tradesmen, but it is gradual and always seems reasonable, 
provided it is seen in a sufficiently richly textured social-historical context (and this is 
important).  And if one distinguishes between directions given by judges from verdicts given 
by juries, often made up as they were of local tradesmen, then the desire of the judges to 
protect infants from both their own youthful susceptibility and improvidence and the rapacity 
of tradesmen bent on profiting from those qualities in their customers, becomes all the more 
marked.  Some of the cases can be seen in terms of a contest between a judge protective of 
the infant defendant and a jury protective of the interests of the plaintiff businessmen. 
We have no hesitation in concluding that, put shortly, the law’s motive in limiting 
infants’ contractual capacity was firmly rooted in a genuine desire to protect the young; to 
keep youthful indiscretion and improvidence or (especially in the case of apprenticeships or 
contracts of service) mere vulnerability, from ruining their adult lives. 
Today, the question of the contractual capacity of young persons has to a large extent 
dropped off the lawyer’s and the jurist’s radars, since majority and full contractual capacity is 
attained at an age when the young person is almost certain still to be living under the parental 
roof.  Whether the world of e-commerce, ‘smart phones’, ‘in-app purchases’, social media 
devoted to the marketizing of young people’s interactions and data, will offer a challenge to 
the current situation in this regard is a matter for speculation. There are those who press for 
the voting age to be reduced.  If it is, then should we also say, ‘if they’re responsible enough 
to vote, they are responsible enough to be bound to other decisions, for instance to obtain 
credit’?  If this is debated and there is one day a successor to the Latey Committee, then, in 
the submission of the present authors, its members should be advised that the law has always 
protected the young from the ill consequences of bad decisions so far as it can, in the 
contractual field.  The controls that are there are not controls for the sake of control but for 
the sake of welfare.  In the policy world of the ‘vulnerable consumer’, history shows us that 
one vulnerable group, at least, has always had protection and we should be careful not to cast 
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